Article

Doctrine of the Ciphers Intercursions among Zeropoint-Utopia-Core

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Abstract: The Blochian concept of cipher is discussed in some detail with a view to possible developments in the modern philosophy of nature. Parallels and differences are listed as to the Idealistic tradition in Germany preceding Bloch’s approach. It is found that within the framework of a strict process philosophy of the Blochian type, life forms and human (reflexive) life in particular show up as systemic parts of a nature that is projecting itself towards what has not yet become, hence a strong similarity to Schelling’s approach.

Keywords: philosophy of nature; process philosophy; semiology; aesthetics

1. Introduction: Ciphers and Music

One of the most prominent (and difficult) categories in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch is that of the “cipher”. In order to be able to share this view, it suffices to note that Bloch himself points to the possibility to conceptualize inorganic matter, comprising a large part of the Universe, by means of this category: “The Universe is alongside with its seize reliably full of meanings and ciphers” [1] (p. 924).

So what is a cipher according to Bloch? Essentially, a cipher in the traditional sense is a representation of meaning such that it must be re-translated first (deciphered) in order to achieve a result as to what this meaning is actually all about. In philosophy (e.g., in the case of Jaspers), ciphers can be understood as representations of what is underlying the observable world. Hence, observable phenomena are the ciphers which—when re-translated (deciphered, decoded)—reveal the world’s ground. In Bloch, however, this ground is not a metaphysical ground in the strict sense, but instead it is what the world eventually will become, because for Bloch, the observable world is permanently in the process of becoming. Hence, the world is not yet completely observable, but (at best) only to the degree of what has been disclosed so far by means of its shining forth (Vorschein). Primarily, for Bloch, this can be found chiefly in the works of art.

Hence, in Bloch, this concept shows up already as early as in the first version of “Spirit of Utopia” (1918), which is a book on the topic of self-encounter and as such deals primarily with the philosophy of music. While dealing with sociological approaches to music, Bloch comes to the conclusion that music is “a sphere of its own” and cannot be subsumed in terms of the category of the contemporary, at least as far as its major compositions are being concerned. Instead, within music, a type of non-simultaneousness shines forth as Nietzsche would have already recognized. But the difference as compared with Nietzsche would be that from now on, this non-simultaneousness is not anymore the expression of a delayed arrival, but of a future instead that lives within it “as spirit of utopian degree”, which “in the midst of history and sociology does nothing else than building its own house” [2] (p. 57 sq.). Hence, although a sociology of music could explain many aspects, the crucial aspect would be missed.

Similar to the later concept of alliance with nature (Naturallianz) whose actualization presumes an “inter-human becoming of the concrete, a social revolution that is” [1] (p. 813), already in his early works, Bloch couples a possible being sublated of music into a community to the social conditions in this sense of an “inter-human becoming of the concrete”. Works of music could only be derived from or even domiciled in a historic formation, Bloch says,
“where the inter-human, i.e., the socially interested perspectivity coincides with its topical object, hence, with a custom as seen in terms of an ongoing intersubjective relationship or with the economy, law or state as one form of it.” As this condition is not yet actualized, grand artistry lives only in terms of “an apriori spectator”. Music requires “the lonely, historically excentric typification according to apriori problems of impact and matter” [2] (p. 59). Hence, Bloch raises music to become a cipher in the sense of the philosophy of history that is declared to be the representation of the spirit of utopia as such—very much in the sense of a co-operation of tendency and latency, i.e., of the intensity and shining forth of the not yet fully explicated essence of the world within it which is still to be deciphered. Composers like Bach, Beethoven or Mahler belonged to those whose Ego (Ich) heard “whisperings ( . . . ) trans-individual messages which determine the design of the work.” This “ingenious being-so-determined [transforms itself] into a cipher for a trans-historical canonical diapason”, for a binding kind of sounding through the whole scale, in other words through all spaces and times. Neither a “economically sociological pragmatic” nor a “morphological synoptic” would possess the instruments “to grasp this far-fetched series of relations which is of a truly character of the philosophy of history.” Within it “the grand individuals become categories”, first of all within the sphere of music, but also within the other arts. From this, one could form a “system of categories” whose foundation would be “the consciousness of ourselves, God’s consciousness of himself” [2] (p. 59 sq.) So far, so challenging.

Despite this superelevation Bloch distances himself from a particular kind of mystifying music. He does this in an interesting discussion of Schelling, of all philosophers that one who similar to Bloch attributes an important role to the aesthetical. In his lecture course on the arts (Philosophie der Kunst, 1803), Schelling formulates: “Architecture as fine art has to represent the organism as essence of the inorganic and thus the forms of the organic as preformed within the anorganic” [3] (§ 110, p. 580). With a view to the Blochian category of latency this is a relevant thought indeed. Schelling notes an arc spanning from architecture to music and thus an identity that is based on the inorganic essence of both. Schelling formulates: “§ 107. The inorganic form of art or the music within sculpture is architecture ( . . . ) Different notes: (1) That architecture = music follows provisionally from the common concept of the inorganic. This is because music is the inorganic form of art”. We would have to conclude from this that music as an inorganic form of art should has to express what is already disposed within its formal means in terms of the organic or living as to that. Hence, Schelling continues:

“The original schematism is the number where the formed, particular is symbolized by the form or the general itself. What thus is in the field of schematism underlies the arithmetic determination in nature and art, architecture as music of sculpture follows hence the necessarily arithmetic situation, but because it is music in space, practically frozen music, this situation is a geometrical one at the same time.” [3] (§ 107, pp. 572–576)

Although Schelling deals here with architecture in the first place, Bloch refers to this passage and characterizes Schelling as originator of a concept of music that he thinks unfounded: “From Schelling comes the genuine conceptual of the proposition that music is nothing but the pointing to architecture and frozen music in turn.” [2] (pp. 189, 1923: 175), [4] (p. 221 sq.). What Bloch probably takes umbrage at is that Schelling argues towards a pre-determined goal, utilizing a proposition more geometrico including proof, notes, and helpful remarks followed by a corollary: “Architecture designs according to arithmetical or geometrical proportions, because it is music in space.” [4], (p. 576). Music would be thus instrumentalized in an inappropriate manner in order to be able to actualize a superordinate scheme of reasoning. Hence, Bloch’s verdict with a view to Schelling: “Afterwards it will be easy indeed for the philosopher to ruin music with the tortured large capacity essence of extinct astrally grounded relationships.” [2] (p. 189) [4] (p. 221 sq.). Bloch argues that Schelling would only deal with Greek music, melody, and their cosmic relationships, while everything that does not fit the framework would be declined as being chaotic. Schelling would claim that “( . . . ) the deepest in the world could be thought only as something of
utmost objectiveness of ready-made cosmic type.” [2] (p. 189). This is what Bloch discards while emphasizing the subject:

“But the more forceful the warning within the interpretation of the ciphers of the moment of sound to only deal with human receptivity which is unspoiled from all of the astral mysticism in music, and with the sole miracle of ingenuity that also does not rely on anything else than its homogeneous transcendence of the soul.” (Ibid.)

In order to unclose the ciphers inherent in the sound, one has to start from the human subject alone, because the sense of hearing is the condition for evoking those effects in body, mind, and soul, whose cause in music is still not yet deciphered.

2. Ciphers and Nature

2.1. Kant—Schelling—Schiller

In this present context, the metaphysical meaning of the word “cipher” is important, introduced for the first time by Johann Georg Hamann referring to a biblical motive: “The book of nature and of history are nothing but ciphers, hidden signs that need a key that interprets the Holy Scripture [. . . ]” [5] (§ 8). Kant also utilizes this concept in his third Critique of 1790: “One will formulate: This interpretation of aesthetical judgements in terms of the moral sentiment may look far too scholarly for visualizing it as the true exegesis of the cipher scripture by which nature with its forms figuratively speaks to us.” [6] (§ 42, p. 398). Schelling, in turn, refers to this latter passage in his “System of Transcendental Idealism” of 1800: “Nature speaks to us figuratively in its purposeful forms, says Kant, the interpretation of its cipher scripture provides us with the apparition of freedom within us.” [7] (p. 608). And he continues: “What we call Nature is a poem that is locked within a secret wonderful scripture.” [7] (p. 628).

A somewhat different stress can be found in Schiller’s “Philosophical Letters” of 1786 [8], especially with a view to his physiological works related to his dissertations in Medicine. Schiller formulates in his “Philosophy of Physiology”:

“The effects as they are present exterior to myself are motions of matter (. . .) Hence, the mind must be either impenetrable without being matter—But who can segregate the concept of matter from the impenetrability of matter? Or must be the mind itself matter? Thinking would be thus motion (. . .) Be it as it may, there is indeed a force between matter (of which effects shall be imagined) and the mind. This force is completely different from the world and the mind. I take it away, then all effects of the world onto the mind vanishes. Nevertheless, there is still mind. Its loss has created a fissure between world and mind. Its presence clears up, wakes, stimulates everything around.—I call it mediative force (Mittelkraft).” [9] (p. 176 sq.)

In Schiller’s third dissertation one result of his analyses is “(. . .) the wonderful and strange sympathy which makes the heterogenous principles of man practically an essence. Man is not soul and body, man is the most intimate mixture of these two substances.” [10] (§ 18, p. 30). In the Philosophical Letters, Julius sends an essay to his friend Raphael, wherein he has written the following:

“The Universe is a thought (an idea) of God. After this ideal representation of the mind had been converted into actuality and the born world had filled the fissure of its creator (. . .) it is thus the profession of all thinking creatures to recover in this present whole the first drawing, to seek the rule in the machine, the unity in this synthesis, the law within the phenomenon, and to re-insert the building onto its layout. Hence, for me there is only one single phenomenon in nature, the thinking creature”.

In other words, the original unity has been lost by means of its reification. It is the task of humans to analyze the world towards its starting point when given the presently accessible. The concept of nature remains open for the time being, and it is not yet clear
what may eventually follow from this and why the “thinking creature” should be the sole “phenomenon in nature”. Julius continues:

“The grand composition we call world remains remarkable for me only because it exists in order to symbolically signify for me the manifold exteriorizations of its essence. Everything inside and outside of myself is nothing but a hieroglyph of a force which is similar to myself. The laws of nature are ciphers that are re-combined by the thinking creature in order to make itself comprehensible. (It is) the alphabet by which all minds communicate with the perfect mind and with themselves.” [11] (p. 115 sq.)

In this sense, all products, humans including, carry something within themselves that is connected to the original identity. By means of deciphering the laws of nature can a connection with the original idea be established, and reflexion of the self-being proper can take place as part of nature’s activity. In his “epistemological excursion” undertaken by Julius, “Schiller reflects the relationship between concept and object” [12] (p. 1342):

“As the reflexive power develops the conditions of the idioms, these conditions must be actually present within the objects. Hence, truth is not a property of the idioms, but of the conclusions; not the similarity of the sign with what is signified, of the concept with the object, but accordance of this concept with the laws of reflexive power”.

The structure (“given conditions” (Verhältnisse) [13]) of language must correspond to the structure of objects. Hence, the postulate for the accordance of the logic of thinking and the logic of being. And Schiller continues:

“Likewise the lore of magnitudes avails itself of ciphers which are nowhere present than on paper, and finds by using them what is present within the actual world. What kind of similarity have e.g., the letters A and B, the signs: and =, + and—With the fact that shall be gained?—Nevertheless, the comet rises on the remote sky having been announced centuries ago, nevertheless, the expected planet emerges in front of the sun’s disc. The world explorer Columbus makes the questionable bet with an unknown ocean as to the infallibility of his calculation to look for the missing second half of the known hemisphere, to look for the famous island Atlantis that should fill a gap on his geographical plan. He found it, this island of his paper, and his calculation was correct after all. Would it have been less valuable, if a hostile tempest had crashed his ships and chased them backward to their home?—A similar calculation performs human reason when measuring the non-sensual with the help of the sensual and applying the mathematics of its conclusions onto the hidden physics of the superhuman. But still the last rehearsal for its calculations is missing, because no traveller returned from that country in order to tell about his discovery.” [11] (p. 135 sq.)

Letters and signs, language and mathematics (formalized language), do not have similarity with the objects, but they find, as representations of the human thinking which is at their roots, an equivalent counterpart in the world.

2.2. Bloch

2.2.1. Metaphysics and Categories

The metaphysical component in Bloch’s writings remains sustained. Its meaning for the philosopher shows up in the comparison of music and metaphysics when utilizing the concept of counterpoint and visualizing both according to their specific circumstances:

“Certainly, everything is well-ordered, with equally mathematical as order in it, and thus the kinds of counterpoint, the reference, organization and order systems of the high table, the feast, the dance, the strategy, the lore of functions, the systematization altogether alike, let themselves developed in a lore of order: The
essence of music however, is so little exhausted by this and even less as logic and the doctrine of categories in metaphysics can reproduce.”

Mathematics and order, strategies and functions, all this is part of music, very much in the sense as logic and the doctrine of categories connect with metaphysics. But in both these cases, the essence cannot be expressed in an exhaustive manner. Bloch arrives at this conclusion when reflecting on the limits of form in music. For him, music fails, “if not the wherefrom, but the whereto, the tempest, is to be deduced ( . . . ), the what for and whereupon ( . . . ), the deeper why and what of what makes happy”. Across this “formal cipher”, this “insinuating cipher” of form, “the merely lower (my emphasis) object-assertiveness” the “employing grand subjects themselves ( . . . ) show up as becoming karyograms without distance as standing index of the musical metaphysics of interiority.”

With a view to categories and logic, this formulation is remarkable, because it becomes explicit that for Bloch, the horizon of his philosophizing is not restricted to categories and logic that are difficult to express, but that these formal elements are instead the instruments for searching the clues pointing to the actual or essential. The fact that this formulation is still missing from the first version of “Spirit of Utopia” (1918) and later inserted into the version of 1923 as well as kept in the new version of 1964, underlines its important meaning. In the late magnum opus “Experimentum Mundi” [14], Bloch discusses the arts in terms of an allegorical as well as symbolical interpretation of the concept of shining forth which is manifested in it, and within the regional category of nature [4] (pp. 212, 218).

In order to clarify concepts, we discuss shortly what Bloch calls the object-like (das Objekthafte): the essential pre-condition for a process philosophy of not-yet being (Noch-Nicht-Sein) and of concrete utopia is the openness of what can become, hence the accentuation of the possibility instead of determination. Therefore, the category “possibility” is discussed in detail in a special chapter of Bloch’s “Principle of Hope” [15] (pp. 258–288), where Bloch describes an explicit differentiation of this category by introducing four sub-categories. When referring to the “object-like”, Bloch points to that shift of possibility which is situated between “objectiveness” on the one hand and “actual objects in their actual behaviour” on the other hand. This is called the “objectively-appropriate possible” then. Not “our knowledge of something” is at issue here, but “the something itself as what it can become somehow or other” [1] (p. 254, my emphasis). Note that this is not a theory of the object, but a theory of the subject-matter that is preceding a theory of the object [1] (p. 266). Topical here is “the more or less sufficiently conditioning within the items themselves including their circumstantial issues” that can be unsheathed by the respective categories. Bloch dismisses a possible allegation concerning idealism, “( . . . ) because the investigating-materialistic representation itself belongs to the theory of the subject-matter and is not acting within it or is not coinciding with it, not before it is face-to-face with the objectively-real.” (Ibid.).

For Bloch, the life-long topic was to find adequate categories for a world that is in the process of becoming. In 1918, already he is wrestling with the “( . . . ) enormous problem of a categorical doctrine of the unfinished world.” [4] (p. 388 sq.). Note the important meaning of Aristotelian viewpoints for this philosophy of concrete utopia. However, although Bloch is highly estimating the work of Aristotle, especially as far as the concept of matter is being concerned, he is not convinced by the Aristotelian categories. He argues that already Plato would not have solved the “problem of the paramount concepts of species” ([14] (p. 253), [15]), instead, the latter would entertain a “decorative kind of relationship between means and ends” ([14] (p. 254), [15]), without actually being explicated. The categories of Aristotle alike would be “completely empty and formally general concepts”, imprecisely deduced, “provided with the moment of the accidental”, and above all “not derived from a single principle”. And Bloch continues: “They [the categories] play no particular role within the real-philosophizing of Aristotle, different from the principles.” ([14] (p. 255), [15]).

Only the last category meets a more detailed exposition: “The tenth fundamental designation is interesting—Now I can refer to this τὸ τι ἢνειν and to the οὐσία, the essence.” Bloch notes the difficulty of an appropriate translation: “With the το, the article, and the εἶναι, the being, at the end, everything can be wrapped. Literally it is: the being
that has been [become existing].” (Ibid.). It is quite apparent that Bloch points here to the exclusiveness of the essence. Because the concepts of essence and substance are still frequently discussed [16], we give in the following a quotation from Bloch’s lecture course on Aristotle, in order to clarify his position. The topic is the attempt to interpret the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in more detail:

“The expression comes from the τί ἦτ τις in the sense of Sokrates and covers the question: What is? And when something has been asserted, then this is not a question anymore, not anymore an εἶναι, not more an ἦτ τις, but an ἦν. The point is executed, the determination is done ( . . . ) What is finished, what is released by the question, is the essence of the matter ( . . . ) Τί ἦτ τις is the question, and ἦτ τις is not yet so precisely to the point as is ἦν ( . . . ) This is designating something that is finished and secluded. ( . . . ) Hence, the τί ἦν now, the secluded, the finished, the essence, is wrapped into the two terms τὸ and εἶναι. So what has being been, what has been found from question and answer, is being. This is most probably the meaning of the otherwise untranslatable τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. ( . . . ) When the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is not more discussed within the categorial doctrine, but within the philosophy of the real instead, it is called entelechy. Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is within actuality the entelechy, the acting essence of something and its aim at the same time which is approached by this something that possesses both of them and is sighting at releasing them. ( . . . ) Developing means here to develop something into an already given pre-formed form which is not yet unfolded in the phenomena.”

[15] (p. 255 sq.)

Bloch states that in Aristotle, the concept of matter (understood in terms of “stuff”) makes a development possible, while in the case of the entelechy, the form (as one that harbors essence and aim within itself) is fixed in the first place. This could be recognized in the case of the category of substance (essence) which carries a whiff of anamnesis such that only the past could be recognized, in the sense of “essence as what has been”. Indeed, it would be possible to develop from the given essence “the individual determinations subsequently”. And the essence could also “enforce itself within the phenomenon” [15] (p. 256)—but in the end, this would only be the already fixed given up to the phenomenon.

This debate illustrates the problem: what are the categories that are suitable for a pre-supposed possibility to develop substance or essence? (Though the adequate concept of substance remains to be clarified here.) Already in 1918, Bloch saw the availability of a philosophy that deals with “action, substance as process, truth as sublation of the world”. The time of the “masters of the ready-made and secluded, of fixed figures and definitions, of reflexions instead of productions” is over—he means the “Persians, Chaldeans and Egyptians, the Greeks and the Scholastics”, and by the way: “all of them without noteworthy musical art”:

“Therefore, the great musicians became meaningful to the degree that the being down-to-earth as well as the other fixed, mental liaison to the myth slackened, yes, even folk song and church hymn are not the final food sources and do not carry the final substance of music, now that they have vanished.” [2] (p. 204)

Again, we find the parallel between philosophy and music, because “the latter has grown and has become constitutive to the degree that philosophy has been forced and gifted.” (Ibid.). But: This music, the sound, the listening, the matterless art, have not yet their location: No site. Nowhere. (Christa Wolf) And: οὐ τόπος.

“To such an extent is there another light within this clairvoyance of the ear, of the music and of the production, and on the contrary to ancient mysticism that dealt with finished realities hyper-clear in themselves, its planet has not yet revolved so far that also its other side, averted from us as well as from itself, could be recognized.” (Ibid.)

(Spontaneously, we have to think of Pink Floyd’s “The Dark Side of the Moon” (1973).) However, Bloch does not refer to the dark side of the mentioned planet, but to the yet
unfinished rotation which is to be continued such that humans and also the planet itself are enabled to recognize what is not yet illuminated [17].

Already during World War I (“Spirit of Utopia” was written in 1915/1916 [2] (p. 347)) Bloch believes in the future knowledge. He pleads for a completion of knowledge about the world, based on a “logic ( . . . ) that does not take anymore, but gives instead”: “Hence, nescience is the final reason for the appearance of this world, and knowledge as the lightning of awareness once striking into our darkness and the unconstructible question constitutes thus the inescapably sufficient ground for the phenomenon, for the arrival in the other world.” [4] (p. 389), [2] (p. 287).

2.2.2. Numbers and Figures

Bloch’s increased attention towards problems of nature and materialism in general can be observed clearly when looking at the volume “Logos of Matter” [18] published from his legacy. Therein, we find the text “Numbers and Utopian Figures, Nature as Past and as Orient (Morgenland)” written in the period 1944–1945, the title being reminiscence of the poem given in the novel of Novalis “Heinrich von Ofterdingen” (1800): “When not anymore numbers and figures/are the keys for all creatures ( . . . )” [19] (p. 395). According to Bloch, Novalis explicates in this poem a shining forth of what is being intended with what he himself calls the category of the “ultimum”. Apparently, Bloch values the rationally founded early romanticism as a precursor of his own approach. Being a mathematician himself [20], Novalis is skeptical as to the pure quantification dominating the field (at his time), in particular with a view to a nature within which their qualities are not exhausted by what is measurable. A similar view to mathematics is fostered by Bloch who once studied physics himself and possessed a sufficient competence in these questions:

“The manuscript of the book on materialism [21] has been refereed by the physics Nobel prize winner Percy Bridgman and reviewed by Einstein’s successor to the chair of theoretical physics at the German university of Prague, Philipp Frank (after 1938 in Harvard) [22]. [Bloch] explicitly exempts quantum physics from his critique aiming at civic forms of decay concerning the sciences such as formalistic constructions of concepts and ( . . . ) omissions of qualitative contents of nature [21] (p. 316). He underlines instead that in quantum physics a region of nature is being investigated that has remained hidden so far [21] (p. 316 sq.) [23] (p. 336).”

Hence, for Bloch, there is no question that mathematics is an instrument that also serves the insight in the philosophy of nature. He refers to the “Dialectic of Nature” and the “Anti-Duehring” given by Friedrich Engels, where the latter engages differential calculus in order to “map processes, not fixed facts and static-mechanical laws”. [18] (p. 409). However, he notes that mathematics, as it has been developed up to now as a calculating element which dominates economics as well as the sciences, would not be able to map or express anything new. Hence, “A direction even in the sense of a transition from quantity to quality is with present mathematical means completely unexpressable.” (Ibid.).

But while this topic remains uncompensated for Bloch, he utilizes an appropriate motto taken from Leibniz in his book “Experimentum Mundi” in order to signal that hope for something new is also coupled to numbers:

“In the meantime, humans conserved the tendency to believe that with the support of numbers, of characters, and of a new language which some call Adamitic, Jakob Boehme calls Language of Nature, we can expect miraculous discoveries.” [14] (p. 213).

But more important than the number is the figure for Bloch. Assuming a dialectic picture of nature, Bloch introduces what he calls “subjective core of nature”, and he amends: “of necessity always still hypothetic”. He visualizes this “subject of nature” as the “motor of a dialectic of nature” which is searching for itself “within the subject-object relationships of nature and manifests itself in them” [14] (p. 218). And the question how this subject of
nature searches for itself and manifests itself is answered by means of “dialectical forms of tension, process figures themselves” [14] (p. 219).

This is what characterizes the center of Bloch’s utopian philosophy of nature: these figures in fact, turn out to be “objective forms”. They constitute a “qualitative-specific ornament” through their manners of apparition (Ibid.). Such figures have to be read and deciphered. Bloch refers to Leonardo and Duerer who have talked of “figures” themselves: “The world is full of figure”, as Duerer says [1] (p. 1594). The significant of these figures is their behaviour: They “emerge from the process by means of a transitory testing, and not at all by fixing.” They are themselves “interpreting, construing, pointing”, and this common property makes them to be ciphers: “And not only to be ciphers for the human art of reading ( . . . ), but indeed real ciphers, an object-like floating in forms that can be elevated into an object-like being of utopia within attempted successfulness.” [14] (p. 219).

At the same time, during the act of processing, the figures involved into the exterior, it is necessary to also “co-process a mathesis of the new within the self-qualifying, uncompleted of the qualification” [14] (pp. 218 sq.). One route towards this necessity could be indicated by the ornament itself [24].

Bloch differs between the ornament in the traditional sense of a structure that is repeating itself on the one hand, and the ornament in the metaphorical sense on the other: for the one, he mentions the theory of groups, initiating a “mathesis of artificial ornaments such as in the case of the palmette, meander, arabesque, window of roses.” For the other, he mentions the “geometricum as eidos of nature” as example, also “represented by the arts” [14] (p. 219). This latter concept, originally from the Greek εἶδος, sheds some illuminating light onto formed nature in the sense of Bloch. In particular, it is the “geometricum” (with a reminiscent reference to Duerer) that serves the analysis of formed nature then. Hence, the idea that form is a constitutive attribute of nature, different (perhaps) from the general as such [14] (p. 254), [15].

It may be helpful to refer now to the Aristotelian concept of ἀρχή about which Bloch complains that it would have lost its “cosmological sense (. . . ) which means roughly what we call ‘principium’, literally equivalent to ‘the beginning’” [14] (p. 256), [15]. For Bloch, the four principles in Aristotle are stuff, form, cause, and purpose. Stuff (ὕλη) and form (εἶδος) are the genuine principles in so far:

“The four basic principles coincide in the end with stuff and form when form absorbs both cause and purpose, respectively, because it becomes cause of purpose. On the other hand, elements of cause cross over into ὕλη, because this is either perturbing or dividing. The principles, too, do thus not behave to each other within a full, dense, non-overlapping relationship.” [14] (p. 257), [15]

The determination of the relationship between the principles entertained points clearly to a critical view of them. They share this with the concept of categories. However, for Bloch, it is Aristotle’s doctrine of possibility that gains a fundamental importance for his own ontology of not-yet being, primarily because of its differentiation between the being in-possibility and the being according to possibility. Development and entelechy show up again within this context:

“Stuff and form share the common concept of development. What is injected in the stuff as the emptily possible is unfolded by the form which is agency form as well as an active form as well as a teleological form, emerging from the facility into actuality. Each object strives to become what the entelechy is, and each motion is one from the facility towards fulfilment. Aristotle calls in one passage of the ‘Physics’ motion itself the unfinished entelechy.” (Ibid.)

Hence, Bloch’s proposition is that nature salvages forms within itself that have not yet been actualized and that have the potential to let something new and essential emerge in the process of their actualization. Within the framework of Bloch’s doctrine of archetypes, the core of the utopia of nature becomes especially clear: Bloch derives the concept of archetype in the tradition of Augustine who utilizes this concept as “circumscription of
the Platonic *eidos*, hence, of each shape of species.” However, he does not extend this to a general application after all. It is not before the onset of romanticism that Bloch can find a full approach, when “the ancient expression (i.e., *eidos*, D. Z.) is referred to a categorical inventory of pictorially objective kind which is penetrating the somewhat stocky incidents.”

The language characteristics in this passage from “Principle of Hope” can be recovered in the Leipzig lectures again: as to Aristotle, the principles are characterized here in a pejorative manner, because their relationship is called to be “not full and dense”, while the categorical inventory is said to penetrate the somewhat stocky incidents. Incidents of this kind are of a structurally critical nature such as the situations associated with Romeo and Juliet, e.g., Antony and Kleopatra, Philemon and Baucis, and so forth, taken as archetypal persons describing phases in the development of love, as in Novalis. For him, “the extraordinary composition of all elements within these archetypes” is decisive [1] (p. 182).

Against the generally accepted opinion that archetypes are something past, Bloch finds in some of them something uncompensated:

“The utopian function discovers thus not only the cultural excess that belongs to itself, but it also retract an element from the ambiguously archetypal depth which is an archaically stored anticipation of what is not yet aware, not yet successful. To speak in terms of the dialectical archetype itself: The anchor that sinks here into the ground is at the same time the anchor of hope. What is sinking contains the rising, can contain it. Yes, the same with all that signified double-essence, what is able of utopia, demonstrates and proves its worth in the end, when the archetypes cross over to object-like ciphers which they have mapped according to nature in the first place.” [1] (p. 187 sq.)

Faust would have asked: “What do we mean with this enigmatic word?”1 (v. 1337). Originally, this was the reaction to Mephistopheles, who introduced himself saying: “(I am) part of the power that permanently wants the evil and permanently creates the good.”1 (vv. 1335 sq.). The thinking of Bloch as to the philosophy of nature is probably of equal complexity to mediate as this quotation from Goethe [25]. Indeed, Bloch conceives that “condensed” parables of nature (e.g., that of the “still waters run deep”) “are not at all formed from human material, neither of archaic times nor of later history. They display instead a piece of double scripture of nature itself, a kind of real cipher or real symbol.” [1] (p. 188).

In order to come to a close without being able to actually exhaust the topic itself, this final quotation might be helpful:

“A real symbol is one whose signified object is veiled itself within the real object and not only in terms of its grasping by humans. Hence, it is the expression for what within the object has not yet become manifested, but is signified within the object and by the object. The human symbolical picture for this is only substitutionally represented. Lines of motion (fire, lightning, figure of sound and so forth), shapes of distinguished objects (form of palm, cat shapes, human face, Egyptian crystal style, gothic forest style and so forth) indicate this real cipher. A precisely embossed part of the world shows up thus as a group of symbols of object-like type whose mathematics and philosophy are still uniformly enduring ( . . . ) Real ciphers are not static, they are figures of tension, tendentious process shapes, and in the first place, just on this route, symbolical shapes. This borders on the problem of an object-like utopian doctrine of figures, in the end on the forgotten Pythagorean problem of a qualitative mathematics, of a qualitative philosophy of nature afresh.” (Ibid.).

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1 The generation of the ornament has been topical already in Bloch’s first (1918-) version of “Spirit of Utopia”.
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