Survey on fault-tolerant vehicle design

Daniel Wanner¹, Annika Stensson Trigell¹, Lars Drugge¹, Jenny Jerrelind¹

¹KTH Royal Institute of Technology, School of Engineering Science, Department of Aeronautical and Vehicle Engineering, SE–100 44 Stockholm, Sweden, dwanner@kth.se

Abstract

Fault-tolerant vehicle design is an emerging inter-disciplinary research domain, which is of increased importance due to the electrification of automotive systems. The goal of fault-tolerant systems is to handle occurring faults under operational condition and enable the driver to get to a safe stop. This paper presents results from an extended survey on fault-tolerant vehicle design. It aims to provide a holistic view on the fault-tolerant aspects of a vehicular system. An overview of fault-tolerant systems in general and their design premises is given as well as the specific aspects related to automotive applications. The paper highlights recent and prospective development of vehicle motion control with integrated chassis control and passive and active fault-tolerant control. Also, fault detection and diagnosis methods are briefly described. The shift on control level of vehicles will be accompanied by basic structural changes within the network architecture. Control architecture as well as communication protocols and topologies are adapted to comply with the electrified automotive systems. Finally, the role of regulations and international standardization to enable fault-tolerant vehicle design is taken into consideration.

Keywords: reliability, safety, wheel hub motor, diagnosis, control system

1 Introduction

In the last two decades, the electrification of automotive chassis systems enable extended functionalities and active safety systems. Recent studies have shown a reduction of single vehicle accidents of about 50% for vehicles equipped with electronic stability control systems (ESC) [1, 2], and thereby highlighting the potential of these systems. Incentives by governments, research foci of vehicle manufacturers and the shortage of natural resources support the prediction from several studies to a widespread adoption of hybrid electric and electric vehicles (HEV) as well as by-wire applications in the coming decades [3–5]. Both aspects, electrification of chassis and drive train systems, lead to higher degree of over-actuation, and thus to an increased flexibility of the vehicle behaviour.

Vehicular systems have certain requirements that shall be fulfilled during the design of a new system. The most important ones are active and passive safety, dynamic driving performance, driving dynamics and handling as well as driving comfort [6]. High system dependability is needed to fulfil these requirements. However more electric and electronic (E/E) components increase the complexity and can possibly fail. Thus the probability of a faulty vehicle is higher with the future vehicle generation. Faults of E/E components appear in general more randomly than mechanical faults. Software faults are however more systematic, as errors produced in the development phase are not uncommon. These faults can appear in different forms, both locally and globally.

The breakdown statistics of the German Automobile Club for passenger cars in 2010 show that two thirds of all breakdowns are based on E/E faults. The electrical components with battery, generator and starter motor have the highest percentage (42%) [7]. Over 20% are based on controller faults. Mechanical failures excluding punctures are rather seldom. However studying electrical machines in more detail it can be found that over 50% of all failures are mechanical due to bearings, stator windings and external equipment [8]. The power electronic con-
ponents in a system need a higher level of fault-tolerance. Some components need a higher level of fault-tolerance (e.g. brake system) than others (e.g. sunroof motor). Depending on how strict the requirements on fault-tolerance are, the following degradation levels can be distinguished:

- **Fail-operational (FO)** - The component stays operational after one failure, thus one failure is tolerated.
- **Fail-safe (FS)** - The component is brought actively or passively to a safe state, if one or more failures occur.
- **Fail-silent (FSIL)** - The component is switched off (externally quiet) and does not send wrong signals to the rest of the system, if one or more failures occur.

FO is necessary if no safe state can be reached directly after the component fails. For adjusting to the fault severity, FO can be split into the classes long and short time [14]. One other option is the graceful degradation [15], where the less critical functions are shut down to allocate the resources to the more critical function and maintain availability. A safe state can be reached faster and easier in the automotive domain compared to other domains, e.g. aerospace [15]. Therefore the fault-tolerance level in road vehicles is usually limited to one or two failures due to cost, weight and package reasons. However with emerging x-by-wire systems, other electronic systems can bring the system to a safe state, i.e. through a still operational unit or an active FS unit, as mechanical backup is omitted. This brings the fault-tolerance in the automotive domain to a new stage, where it has to attain more attention in the development process [16]. The FSIL principle has the advantage to appear only as one fault towards the external world, namely the shutdown of the component itself. This fault is visible for the whole system and can be intercepted by active replication of the component, i.e. redundancy. Thus a fault is localized, encapsulated and explicitly dealt with at its source. A spread of faults within the system is then not possible. This method simplifies the fault handling strategies drastically [17].

### 2.2 Redundancy

The goal of a fault-tolerant system is to have enough time for counteractions in the event of a serious failure, i.e. provide a "self-repairing" capability to enable the driver to stop the vehicle safely [10]. Redundancy keeps the system operational and is reached by adding backup hardware, software, information processes and subsystems with the same function to the system as the original unit. Sensors, actuators, microcontrollers and the communication network are typical electrical and mechanical components that have a redundant design scheme [14].

The two basic types of electronic hardware redundancies are the static and the dynamic redundancy. The static redundancy has three or more parallel units with the same input, e.g. hydraulic airplane actuators. All units are active and connected to a voter, which compares the
signals to each other. The correct signal is chosen by a majority decision. Having one-out-of-three faulty units, the voters will output the two healthy units. No sophisticated fault detection is needed in this case. Due to higher costs and weight the dynamic redundancy is often used instead [11]. Dynamic redundancy as alternative option desires less units, but more information processing within the system. If a fault is detected, the system is switched to the redundant state. This different standby system can be distinguished. Hot standby units are continuously operating and fast switching times can be accomplished. However these units age faster, hence they are only used in safety-critical systems like aviation. The cold standby is only activated when needed, e.g. backup power generator. Therefore the start-up time is longer and two additional switches are needed, but the unit has less wear. An additional standby unit, typically added in parallel, allows the system to tolerate also an additional fault. For vehicular x-by-wire systems, the fault-tolerance with dynamics redundancy with cold standby is attractive. Different redundancy structures can be used to increase availability. If one fault shall be tolerated, thus to fail-operational and thereafter switch to a fail-safe state, either a triplex, quardruplex or duo-duplex structure each with static redundancy or a duplex structure with dynamic redundancy can be used. However the easiest to realize is the duo-duplex (two static redundancies in parallel) structure, as no fault detection is needed and the modularity makes is simpler. Actuators are designed as fault-tolerant if the above described redundancies are applied. Furthermore, smart sensors, that have self-diagnostic capability, are used in vehicles more often nowadays [14].

2.3 Design process

The ability to design a technical system in a fault-tolerant manner is described by the term system dependability. This includes all aspects of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) for safety-critical and fault-tolerant systems. System dependability shall be given at all times [10, 16]. In order to achieve a dependable system, information about what actually can happen to the system and what that means for the behavior of the system is necessary, i.e. RAMS is crucial for the design phase of a fault-tolerant system. Several methods to analyze a system regarding RAMS, such as reliability analysis [19], hazard analysis [20], event and fault tree analysis [21], or failure mode and effect analysis [21–23], are gathered under the domain fault avoidance and removal. Usually several of these methods are combined in the development process of a new system to achieve a more detailed analysis [14, 21]. This leads to increased quality throughout the whole design process.

3 Fault-tolerant control concepts

Control systems with a feed-forward structure are generally reacting onto any kind of fault in the system with a different output signal. Feedback control on the other hand has due to the higher complexity a certain robustness, which also covers small or multiplicative faults in the actuator or the process. Sensor faults however lead directly to deviations. An active fault-tolerant control system is required, if the fault is too large to be covered through the robustness of the controller, otherwise the dynamic behaviour becomes sluggish or less damped and might get unstable. In Figure 1 this system is illustrated. Additionally to the actuators, process, sensors and feedback controller, the active fault-tolerant control system consists of FDD methods and fault management containing decision methods and reconfiguration to keep the system operational in an acceptable way. This section provides an overview on methodologies of vehicle motion and fault-tolerant control as well as fault detection and diagnosis.

3.1 Vehicle motion control

Vehicle motion control is originally based on functional control. Today, the integration of different functional subsystems, such as ESC or super imposed steering system [24, 25], into an enclosed and functioning automotive system gets more important with the amount of subsystems. This since functions overlap and might interfere with each other [26, 27]. The anti-lock braking system for instance is today an integral part of the ESC. Studies comparing the effects of single functional subsystems, acting mainly onto the lateral dynamics, have shown different vehicle dynamical potentials. A co-existent application of these subsystems can even lead to negative vehicle behavior; while their rule-based integration exploits the benefits to a better extent [28, 29]. The integrated chassis control approach merges single control tasks into a functional or directional control and distributes the signals according to the driving situation, the input of the driver and the dynamic limitations of every actuator. This enables safety and performance improvements simultaneously [30–34]. Bottom-up approaches are the common pragmatic approaches in the industry. The integration of existing chassis control systems with heuristic control laws [35]. Integrated chassis control can be seen as an intermediate step striving towards a generic control [30, 36]. Integrated chassis control is developed by the industry, such as Bosch.
3.2 Fault-tolerant control

Fault-tolerant control (FTC) strategies aim to prevent a fault from becoming a system failure. An operational system shall be guaranteed despite if one or several faults occur, thus FTC accommodates component failures automatically. They are capable of maintaining overall system stability and acceptable performance in the event of such a failure [18]. A FTC system is a holistic approach that includes control, FDD and reconfiguration of the system. FTC is divided into two different types - passive and active FTC.

3.2.1 Passive FTC

Passive FTC strategies react on a set of presumed failure modes. Their design is fixed and robustness is only given for this presumed set of failure modes. The recent developments in vehicle motion control are designed with respect to robustness and adaptability and thus can be seen as passive FTC. The control algorithm is hereby adjusted to handle certain disturbances and a class of presumed faults without fault isolation. FDD or reconfiguration is not needed for this approach; however this limits the fault-tolerant capabilities [18, 62]. Certain adaptive passive FTC systems, where an active FDD is included, are displayed here. An adaptive passive FTC including an active FDD for an electric vehicle with four individually controlled in-wheel motors is analysed in [63]. Simulation shows the reaction of the system when a fault in one in-wheel motor occurs. The FTC estimates the control gain for driving the vehicle with only small error. Thus the forces are redistributed in a manner that the faulty in-wheel motor is used as little as possible in the tested manoeuvres and the forces between tyre and road are better exploited for the other three motors. However faults appearing in HEVs, like the failure of an electric motor, also for the other three motors. A fault-tolerant control with active reconfiguration is recommended for new electrified vehicle types in order to preserve dependability.

3.2.2 Active FTC

Active FTC strategies respond actively in real-time to the occurrence of a fault, assuming the latter is diagnosed before [62]. This type of strategy compensates faults either by selecting a pre-computed control law or by synthesizing a new one online. Transient and steady-state performance for the controlled process in normal operation and under fault condition are the desired overall goals of active FTC, often also called reconfiguration. These two modes differ significantly. The quality of the system behaviour shall be stressed under normal operation, while during fault condition the system shall survive with an acceptable (degraded) performance [64]. The first keeps the operating behaviour on an acceptable level of the vehicle performance, while the latter guarantees safety, which affects the vehicle
One critical issue is the limited amount of time for FDD and control system reconfiguration. From that, the two main design objectives can be derived. First of all, a precise FDD scheme shall be provided, which delivers information about a fault (time, type and magnitude) and the post-fault model. Secondly, the compensation of the fault-induced changes within new reconfigured control scheme shall be designed, so that the stability and acceptable closed-loop system performance can be maintained. Therefore the parameters of the controllers and, what is even more important, the structure of the new controllers (in terms of order, numbers and types) might have changed. A good summary about methods and applicable algorithms for reconfigurable control and active fault-tolerant control is provided by [18], where it is shown that a combination of different reconfigurable control algorithms for active FTC achieves the best results.

In the automotive domain, early adoption of FTC strategies is found in powertrain management [66]. Other than that, the FTC strategies are often derived from other domains. Recently more attention is brought to it through by-wire vehicles. A hybrid active FTC approach is presented by [65]. Dynamical systems often consist of a continuous and a discrete time process, where these two are connected with logical or decision-making processes, are called hybrid systems. Different hybrid systems are presented and analysed in simulation and tested in a prototype vehicle. A combination of the linear quadratic control method and the control Lyapunov function technique are applied. Four different failure modes are analysed, complete break-down of a wheel torque controller, deterioration of wheel torque controller gain, complete break-down of a steering controller and deterioration of steering controller gain. The case study shows reasonable results for these severe faults and indicates the potential of this type of control system. A model-based bond graph approach for vehicular reconfiguration is found in [67]. Residuals are generated for FDD and have to be recalculated every time a fault occurs, so that the equipment availability database is updated as well. The control system is a lateral force control, which considers

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of this architecture has evolved from a decentralized coexistent control, where each function is controlled independently from each other, to a centralized supervisory control, where all functions are managed from one master controller and assigned to the appropriate subsystem. A multi-layer architecture to handle the growing complexity in E/E systems is suggested by various authors [73, 74]. Such network architecture enables fault-tolerance and thus integration of the control systems described in Section 3.

4.2 Communication architecture

On the physical and data link layer dependable communication systems have to be provided in real-time. Their dependability includes deterministic and time-triggered behaviour, support for distributed control, fault-tolerant services and fast data transfer [75]. The event-triggered CAN protocol does not fulfill these requirements. Protocols with time-triggered behaviour and a global synchronized time are implemented instead. Messages describing the current state (e.g. “brake pressure 50%”) instead of an event (e.g. “deceleration started”) and the time slot allocation, which results in less time delays at fluctuating load conditions, enables an exact prediction of the time delay of each state message [75–77]. Communication protocols for fault-tolerant systems are designed according to the fault hypothesis, which have certain requirements describing number, type and arrival rate of tolerated faults [78]. A methodology for the development and analysis of time-triggered systems is established for existing software development process of the automotive industry [79].

4.2.1 TTCAN

The Time-Triggered CAN protocol is essentially built upon the event-triggered CAN structure with the difference that all data is sent within a time-triggered system matrix. A redundant time master ensures the deterministic behavior [80, 81]. The system matrix consists of several basic cycles that can have different amounts of deterministic and non-deterministic windows. TTCAN supports no dependability services, but implementation as middleware is possible [81]. Different TTCAN buses can be synchronized to achieve fault-tolerant TTCAN networks [82]. Transfer rates are limited to the typical CAN bandwidth of 1 Mbit/s.

4.2.2 TTP/C

The Time Triggered Protocol (TTP/C) is a pure time-triggered protocol. Safety is its main objective, thus strict deterministic sequential order leads to a low flexibility. Redundancy on two channels is given. Dependability services (Section 4.2.4) such as bus guardian, the group membership algorithm, clique avoidance algorithm and the support for mode changes are available directly in the protocol without the need of middleware [75, 80, 83]. The fault hypothesis for TTP/C is well defined and restrictive as faults have to arrive at least two rounds apart. Outside the fault hypothesis the recovery strategy is well defined with a “never gives up” strategy as well [78, 80]. A degraded mode is then activated for keeping the system operational. Transfer rates up to 1 Gbit/s are analysed [78].

4.2.3 FlexRay

FlexRay is a robust, scalable and fault-tolerant bus system specifically designed for automotive x-by-wire applications. Like TTCAN, FlexRay implements the event-triggered function as a lower layer of the time-triggered structure. Hence, flexibility is ranked higher as the mere safety of the protocol [75, 81]. Fault-tolerance is covered by a two channel redundancy and certain integrated dependability services, i.e. bus guardian and clock synchronization. Middleware is needed for other fault-tolerant features. FlexRay can be combined with TTCAN to achieve bit rates of up to 20 Mbit/s, or work redundantly, thereby implementing fault-tolerance to the system [75].

4.2.4 Dependability services

Fault prevention is achieved by declining the members of the communication system to block it by transmitting continuously (“babbling idiot” problem). A bus guardian mediates message transmission by an interface [76, 80, 84]. In distributed systems it is important that all nodes agree on the operational state and work together towards a common goal. Replicating certain nodes is one method [80]. Another option is to develop different algorithms that support the fault-tolerance of the protocols. Group membership provides to all non-faulty processors a consistent view of which nodes are operational and
which are not [84]. Cliques are partitioned clusters, which are not able to communicate with each other. The clique avoidance algorithm always selects one clique to win and causes all nodes of other partitions to shut down, so that a deterministic behavior is always available [85].

4.2.5 Middleware
Dependability services for x-by-wire applications are achieved by middleware, a software layer located above the platform. The automotive industry has developed a modularized architecture called AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System Architecture) [86]. This standardized and open source architecture enables an easy integration and update of new software and hardware modules into an existing structure. Hence prospective safety requirements for vehicles can be met, so that a high E/E system reliability is given. Due to standardized interfaces and modularity the flexibility is increased while the costs are reduced at the same time [87]. The EAST-EEA [88] and the OSEK-VDX consortium [89] are two earlier corporations between automotive partners to achieve open and standardized architectures for distributed control in vehicles. The small operating system for time-triggered applications OSEKTime and the Fault-Tolerant Communication layer (FTCom), which manages redundancy of data in the software layer, are two results of interest for dependable systems [80].

4.2.6 Network topologies
Networks have different types of topologies, with star, bus and ring as the basic topologies. The basic network topologies can be combined in different ways to exploit the advantages and minimize the drawbacks at once. These hybrid topologies have a higher fault-tolerance and specifically suited for vehicular by-wire applications [90].

5 Standards and legislation
Standards and the legislative framework are constraining the design of vehicular systems, and have to be considered. A description of upcoming and recently released regulations and the new developed standard for functional safety (ISO 26262 [91]) is presented. Without achieving perfection, complex systems always contain some sort of errors, due to lack of time and reduction of costs [11]. Thus, standards and regulations for safety-critical systems are necessary to ensure their dependability and standardize functional safety. Regulations are laws that have to be followed or considered during a lifecycle of a product, especially during the development process. The main goal of a regulation is the welfare of the society, which is in the case of road vehicles the health of humans and the environment. While regulations are mandatory, standards are recommendations. It is not only important for industry to follow regulations, but also standards are highly significant. The latter are treated as published state by lawyers, hence liability issues are reduced by following them. Standards shall simplify the development of new products and introduce a common vocabulary, which makes the intra- and inter-company communication easier.

5.1 ISO 26262
Providing safety-compliant systems in the automotive industry takes more effort with the increase of complexity. Validation and testing of critical E/E systems such as by-wire systems, active systems or ESC are challenging and shall therefore be standardized. The ISO 26262 was developed to cope with these matters. It guides the design process of a safety-critical system in order to avoid risk by systematic identification of design faults and random hardware faults. ISO 26262 addresses the needs for an automotive specific, unified, international standard that focuses on safety-critical components. Therefore the unifying standard ISO 26262 was adapted from the previous, more generic safety standard IEC 61508 to fit the specific requirements of the automotive industry [92, 93]. Car manufacturers and suppliers mostly comply with ISO 26262 to reduce liability issues, thus the standard is establishing. Two of the features of the ISO 26262 are the safety lifecycle and the risk-based approach for determining risk classes [92]. The automotive safety lifecycle includes a holistic view on the safety-critical component from the management, via development, production, operation and service to decommission. Testing of the component is conducted throughout the entire process. This reduces development costs, time and mistakes and increases efficiency. The automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) is an automotive specific approach for assigning risk levels and key component of the ISO 26262. The intended functions of the system are analysed with respect to possible hazards. ASIL asks about what will happen to the driver and associated road users, if a failure arises. It is independent from the technology used and based on probability of exposure, the possible controllability by a driver, and the possible severity if a critical event occurs. The levels are defined from A to D, where D is the most critical level with the strictest testing regulations [94]. Automated ASIL allocation for multiple functions, failures and complex, hierarchical networked architectures to encourage the usage of ISO 26262 is presented in [95]. In an ISO 26262 certified development process, hardware and software components have to be qualified for the use in the overall system by testing procedures including fault injection. The so called “proven in use” argument allows application of existing components that did not change with the ISO 26262 adoption. First results for applying ISO 26262 were summarized by [96]. As main result the centric working style with isolated tools for single analysis tasks was recommended to shift to a model centric workflow with full fine-grained traceability and supporting automatic generation of role-based reports. This includes the development of integral han-
5.2 Legislation

The last two decades legislations are pushing especially for lower emissions and safety of vehicles. The result is the electrification of the drivetrain and the increase of complexity in controlling a vehicle with more electric actuators. X-by-wire is a generic term referring to the replacement of mechanical or hydraulic systems, such as braking or steering, by electronic ones [80]. The ECE-Homologations are international agreed, unified technical regulations for vehicles and their components. Three safety-critical systems for vehicle stability control systems, steering systems and braking systems are presented here. The potential of ESC is highlighted in [1, 2]. The World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP29) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) is responsible for a technical regulation for future legislative efforts on ESC. The regulation draft GTR-ESC-2008-06 has been approved in 2008 [97]. Since November 2011 ESC is mandatory for all new registered passenger cars and commercial vehicles in the European Union. The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and Canadian Transport Canada decided already earlier on the same regulation to be required for all vehicles with a weight of up to 4.5 tons that are manufactured from September 2011. Other markets will follow this trend, such as Australian introducing the regulation up to 3.5 ton vehicles in November 2013 [98]. New regulations for by-wire systems are adjusted from the existing regulations, which usually stress a mechanical connection between the driver and the road contact. A conventional steering system consists of the steering wheel, the steering actuator and their mechanical link, as well as a power source. The new steer-by-wire systems have no mechanical linkage, but an electronic connection instead. This brings a lot of safety and comfort benefits for passengers as well as cost, design and environmental benefits. Due to this discrepancy between legal and technical status for a safety-critical E/E systems, a new legislative regulation had to be developed, making the mechanical linkage dispensable. After the application of steer-by-wire systems without mechanical backup in off-highway production machines, the UNECE approved the regulation ECE R79 for road vehicles as well [99]. Other regulations like the self-centering of the steering system are still mandatory for the design [100]. Brake systems have the crucial safety function of decelerating a vehicle safely and effectively regardless its speed, load and road gradient. For new electric regenerative brakes in a HEV, electric and magnetic fields shall not affect the braking system. Furthermore a static total braking force when ignition and start switch switched off has to be generated [100, 101]. Commonly used systems rely on hydraulic and pneumatic actuation. Electronic brake actuation or by-wire braking systems have no such physical connection, but an electronic connection instead. The ECE R13 is the regulation for brake systems, for passenger cars as well as for commercial vehicles. The EU project highly automated vehicles for intelligent transport (HAVEit) showed good results in adapting the regulation to by-wire braking systems for a commercial vehicle. All technical requirements of ECE R13 could not be met though, due to the nature of the electro-mechanical braking system. HAVEit made proposals for updating ECE-R13 to meet the lack of requirements [102].

6 Conclusion

Electrification of automotive drive train and chassis systems enables higher levels of over-actuation, which leads to improved controllability and higher flexibility. This also implies an increased number of fault possibilities. Hence, safe and reliable vehicles can be developed by adding more focus on fault-tolerant aspects. A holistic view has to be considered to avoid bottlenecks within a subsystem, i.e. get a harmonised level of fault-tolerance.

New legislations and standards have been developed in the field to enable by-wire systems with special focus on guaranteeing functional safety. Their adaption demands new control strategies to control a vehicle in a safe way. Passive and active fault-tolerant control are new approaches to the automotive field indicating high potential. Quick and precise fault detection and diagnosis methods have been established and flexible generic control is implemented in various ways, enabling an optimisation of the overall system. Reconfiguration strategies to handle faults in vehicles show promising results and encourage for future research in the area including vehicle validation.

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Authors

Daniel Wanner is a Ph.D. student at Vehicle Dynamics at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, Sweden. He graduated at RWTH Aachen University as Diplom-Wirtschaftsingenieur in 2010. His research covers fault-tolerant control of over-actuated hybrid electric vehicles.

Annika Stensson Trigell is Professor in Vehicle Dynamics at KTH. She graduated with a Ph.D. from Luleå University of Technology (LTU) in 1994. Her research interests are modelling, simulation, analysis and experimental evaluation of vehicle behaviour, and its dynamic interaction with driver and environment.

Lars Drugge is an Associate Professor in Vehicle Dynamics at KTH. He received his Ph.D. from LTU in 2000. His research interests are modelling, simulation and experimental evaluation of the dynamic behaviour of on- and off-road vehicles and overhead power systems.

Jenny Jerrelind is an Assistant Professor in Vehicle Dynamics at KTH. In 2004, she received her Ph.D. in Vehicle Engineering at KTH. Her research interest is on vehicle dynamics with special focus on suspension design and non-linear characteristics.