water

MDPI

*Supplementary materials*

**Text S1. List of Documents Used for Coding the DPs.**

Cardenas, F. (2012). *Community knowledge in action a path towards a sustainable water access: the Case study of AQUACOL, Colombia.* (Master), Lund University, (2797433).

Castro, J. E. (2015). *Socio-technical solutions for the provision of safe WSS in vulnerable communities: a synthesis*. Retrieved from Newcastle upon Tyne, UK.

Red Nacional de Acueductos Comunitarios (2017). *Proyecto de ley "Por medio del cual se consagra el derecho a la autogestión comunitaria del agua, su uso individual, colectivo y se dictan otras disposiciones*. Colombia.

García, M., Peña, M., Toro, A. F., Vargas, J., Cerón, V. A., Tamayo, S., . . . Ruby, V. (2015). Community-Based water associations in Colombia´s rural areas. *WATERLAT-GOBACIT Working Papers, 2*(11), 111.

Lasso, E. (2017). *Los retos y perspectivas de la gestión comunitaria del agua: El caso del Acueducto Comunitario del Corregimiento de Mondomo. Municipio de Santander de Quilichao. Cauca.* (Maestría en Desarrollo Rural), Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia.

Estatuto de la Asociación de Usuarios del Acueducto de mondomo E.S.P, (1997).

Smiths, S., Tamayo, P., Ibarra, V., Rojas, J., Benavides, A., & Bey, V. (2012). *Gobernanza y sostenibilidad de los sistemas de agua potable y saneamiento rurales en Colombia*. Colombia: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

Superservicios. (2014). *Informe Sectorial. Acueducto y Alcantarillado*. Retrieved from Bogotá.

Valle, U. d. (2015). Mondomo: Una Comunidad, un acueducto. *Democratisation of Water and Sanitation Governance by Means of Socio-Technical Innovation*. Cali. Colombia.

Vargas Garcia, M. (2007). Strengthening grassroots capacita with AQUACOL. *waterlines, 26*(2), 2.

**Table S1.** Coding values.

| | Current Situation | | | | After Policy Changes | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Coder 1** | **Coder 2** | **Coder 3** | **Coder 4** | **Coder 1** | **Coder 2** | **Coder 3** | **Coder 4** |
| DP 1A User boundaries | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 |
| DP 1B Resource boundaries | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| DP 2A Congruence local conditions | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| DP 2B Appropriation and provision | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| DP 3 Collective-choice arrangements | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| DP 4A Monitoring users | 1 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 |
| DP 4B Monitoring the resource | 1 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 |
| DP 5 Graduated sanctions | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| DP 6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| DP 7 Rights to organize | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.4 |
| DP 8 Nested enterprises | 1 | 1 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.8 |

**Table S2.** Interrater reliability with Krippendorff alpha.

| | **Current Situation** | **After Policy Change** |
|---|---|---|
| Krippendorff alpha coefficient | 0.4903704 | 0.8294497 |
| Standard Error/Subjects | 0.1288917 | 0.09464457 |
| P-value/Subjects | 0.003460126 | 5.252282e-06 |
| Percent agreement | 0.8815427 | 0.9644628 |
| Percent chance agreement | 0.767562 | 0.7916322 |

Data clearly show that the agreement between coders is higher for the situation after policy change (from 0.490 to 0.829), but in both cases the percentage of agreement is higher than the percentage of chance agreement (p-value < 0.05).